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AGAM-P (M) (26 Jun 69) FOR OT UT 691328

1 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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24 February 1969


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SECTION I

OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. REORGANIZATION

(C) Reorganization to the airmobile configuration continued during the reporting period. The following units arrived or were reorganized:

a. The advance party of Battery A, 4th Battalion, 77th Artillery (ARA) arrived on 13 December 68. The main body of the battery closed on 20 December 1968 and was stationed at Camp Eagle.

b. The aviation section of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 101st Airborne Division Artillery was reorganized into an aviation battery, and was designated Battery A, 377th Artillery on 20 December 1968.

c. The 501st Signal Battalion completed reorganization on 20 December 1968 into a Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, and one Command Operations Company.

d. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, and the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, both of which had been omitted from previous reorganization general orders, were reorganized by USARPAC GO 6, dated 6 January 1969.

e. The advance party, 65 personnel, of the 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion arrived on 29 January 1969.

B. OPERATIONS

1. (C) Operation Nevada Eagle, which started on 17 May 1968, continued throughout the reporting period. This operation is targeted against local force units and the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the lowlands, and main force and North Vietnamese Army Units in

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the mountainous canopied areas. The overall objective is the maintenance of an environment favorable for the continuation of the Government's pacification program in the heavily populated lowlands.

2. (C) The chronological sequence of combat operations for the period 1 November 68 - 31 January 1969 is as follows:

a. Operation PHU VANG III (25 October - 6 November 1968) incorporated elements of the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, 54th ARVN Regiment, Regional Force Companies, along with National Police and US Naval Forces. The objective of the operation was the destruction of the enemy, his supplies and installations in a rice growing area just east of Hue. Intelligence had been received indicating that the Viet Cong Infrastructure was attempting to re-establish some control in PHU VANG, HUONG THUY, and PHU THU Districts of THUA THIEN Province. Contemplated in the operation was the cordon and sweep of the area, followed by an intensive search with emphasis on saturation patrolling, extensive night ambushes, and rapid exploitation of intelligence information. The operation was promptly initiated with forces assuming their blocking positions. Once the cordon was established, the search of the area commenced with positive results. PHU VANG III was immensely successful since it dissolved the existent lines of continuity within the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and resulted in heavy enemy losses of personnel and weapons-- 55 killed, 67 prisoners of war (28 of whom were members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure), and 60 individual weapons. Combined friendly losses were 5 KHA.

b. The TROUI Bridge Cordon (10 November - 18 November 1968) involved the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, a task force from the ARVN 7th Armored Cavalry, the 13th Coastal Group, and elements of Regional Forces, National Police Field Forces and US Naval Forces. The combined elements established a soft cordon and conducted a search operation of the TROUI village area. Of the 1,249 personnel processed through the Combined Intelligence Center, 23 were classified as members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. In addition to the detained personnel, 10 Viet Cong were killed and 2 individual weapons were captured.

c. Operation NAM HOA I (18 November - 7 December 1968) consisted of the 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry, and elements of the 3d ARVN Regiment. Intelligence obtained prior to the operation indicated that the 5th NVA Regiment, including supporting elements, had shifted its area of operation from the traditional base camp areas around NUI KE to the southeast. Intelligence placed the enemy regiment in two valleys SW of Leach Island (YO 826984). The

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combined element's mission was to "find and destroy the 5th NVA Regiment, its leader Col Mot, and its base areas." The operation was initiated by a combat assault of elements of the 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry onto Fire Base Panther III (YD 81000). Following the assault supporting artillery was moved to Panther II (YD 798107) to provide supporting and blocking fires for later combat assaults made by the Combined Forces. Throughout the operation combat assaults and flanking maneuvers, in addition to massed firepower, were conducted to trap and destroy the enemy regiment. When new information was received as to the location of the 5th NVA Regiment elements were moved into position rapidly and effectively. When the operation terminated figures indicated that the enemy had lost heavily - 78 killed, 65 individual and 13 crew-served weapons captured, plus large quantities of mortar rounds, TNT, small arms/automatic weapons rounds, and 122mm rockets. Friendly losses were exceedingly low - 6 killed and 39 wounded.

d. Operation PHU VANG IV (11 December 1968 - 4 January 1969) was initiated to interdict the regrouping of the Viet Cong Infrastructure and local forces following Operation PHU VANG III in PHU VANG, HUONG THUY, and PHU THU Districts of THUA THIEN Province. Elements participating in the operation were the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, the 54th ARVN Regiment, Regional and District Forces, and US Naval Forces. As in Operation PHU VANG III, the area of operation was cordoned, swept, and intensively searched, with emphasis placed on a rapid exploitation of intelligence gained from detainees processed through the Combined Intelligence Center, Combined Allied Forces, as in the previous operation, made imposing strides in rooting out enemy forces, even though the latter had made tremendous progress in recruiting and reorganization in the area. Enemy personnel losses throughout the operation were high - 75 killed and 99 prisoners of war, 35 of whom were confirmed members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. In addition, 60 individual weapons were captured, and numerous bunker complexes were destroyed. Combined friendly losses were low - 2 killed and 12 wounded.

e. Operation Rawlins Valley (16 December - 24 December 1968) was conducted in NAM HOA District, THUA THIEN Province, an area which intelligence data indicated was the Base Area of the 5th NVA Regiment. Participating in the operation were the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, and elements of the 3d ARVN Regiment. The mission assigned to the combined forces was to conduct combat assaults and reconnaissance in force operations in the assigned area of operations and to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, base camps

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and caches. Throughout the operation, several combat assaults were conducted, but with minimal contacts since the enemy avoided engagement with Allied Forces. The success or failure of Operation Rawlins Valley should not be measured in the number of enemy killed (8), but in the effect it had on the enemy. Because of the operation the enemy was forced to withdraw deeper into mountainous areas, abandoning forward positions to Allied destruction. Thus the enemy lost the capacity to launch operations in the immediate future from the NAM HOA area.

f. Operation Todd Forest (31 December 1968 - 13 January 1969) involved the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry and elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment. Intelligence reports placed several NVA Battalions in the NAM HOA District, a known enemy base area and infiltration route. Combined forces conducted combat assaults and reconnaissance in force operations in the assigned area of operation to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, base camps, and materiel caches. Throughout the operation contact was light, but numerous bunker complexes and caches were discovered and destroyed. The operation resulted in 12 enemy killed, and 26 individual weapons captured in addition to large quantities of rice, mortar rounds, and Viet Cong currency. Friendly forces suffered two men wounded during the operation.

g. Operation Platte Canyon (6 January 1969 - continuing) is being conducted by the 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry in areas surrounding FB QUICK II, (YD 891988). Intelligence indicated that contact with the enemy would be substantial as the enemy would attempt to defend his rear supply and base areas in the RUONG-RUONG Valley. Reconnaissance in force operations were initiated with moderate enemy contact, but in most instances the enemy elected to retreat and avoid contact. In addition to RIF operations by company elements, the reconnaissance platoon patrolled the area of operations and discovered and destroyed a large cache and staging area. Enemy losses were heavy-- 57 VC/NVA killed and 57 individual and 1 crew-served weapons captured.

h. Operation Sherman Peak (24 January 1969 - continuing) is being conducted by the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry, and elements of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry, the 3d ARVN Regiment, and the Black Panther Company. Intelligence data has indicated that following the completion of Operation NAM HOA I enemy activity had increased, and the enemy were moving personnel and equipment from rear staging areas in the A SHAU Valley in a northerly direction along Highway 547A, and the

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RAO NAI River into areas near FB VEGHEL (YD 552030). The operation included reconnaissance in force operations and rapid combat assaults by combined US/ARVN Forces in order to locate and destroy enemy personnel and materiel, and the interdiction of Highway 547A.

i. Operation Ohio Rapids began on 24 January 1969 and continues at the end of the reporting period. The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry and elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment, in addition to supporting artillery, combined to strike deep into the suspected base areas of the 6th NVA Regiment to engage and destroy their security forces and materiel. At the end of the reporting period Allied Forces had destroyed the Command Post of the 6th NVA Regiment, killed 21 enemy personnel and captured 37 individual weapons and 7 crew-served weapons.

j. Night operations throughout the coastal lowlands included ambushes and night patrols. Ambushes were especially successful in the eastern portion of PHU LOC District and hampered severely the enemy's attempts to gather food from the heavily populated coastal plains. Especially noteworthy were ambushes during which US troops, after initiating the action, pursued and hunted down the fleeing enemy in the darkness.

k. The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry initiated successful sniper-scout operations on 2 January 1969 after an extensive sniper training program. The snipers have accounted for 7 enemy killed at ranges in excess of 300 meters. A security squad is employed with the sniper teams. The squad patrols in areas away from the snipers' location as a deceptive measure.

l. The 3d Brigade completed the move to Camp Evans. The move started with the deployment of the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry on 30 October. The brigade CP became operational at Evans at 021200H November 1968, and at the same time the brigade assumed operational control of the 3d Squadron (-), 5th Cavalry. The 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry closed in the new area of operation on 6 November, followed by the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry on 7 November. Because much of the brigade area of operation had been heavily booby trapped, mine plow operations were initiated to eliminate this hazard which is costly to us, but relatively cheap for the enemy. In addition to the operations described above the brigade conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations throughout November and December along likely infiltration routes.

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3. (C) Enemy losses during the reporting period were:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>MC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>	<u>RICE</u> <u>(TONS)</u>	<u>DOG</u> <u>(LBS)</u>	<u>SA AMMO</u>	<u>CS AMMO</u>	<u>VCI</u>
NOV	270	83	151	17	32	2	45,755	890	155
DEC	210	26	136	17	44	12	5,759	1,400	135
JAN	<u>195</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>55.8</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>12,232</u>	<u>8,363</u>	<u>142</u>
TOTAL	675	123	449	42	131.8	36	63,746	10,653	432

4. (C) Friendly personnel losses during the reporting period were:

KHA - 54

WHA - 397 (331 evac)

5. (U) The figures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above are the results of actions by the 101st Airborne Division alone, and do not include casualties inflicted by Republic of Vietnam forces in combined operations.

C. TRAINING

1. (C) Sixteen personnel from the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry attended an eight day Scout/Sniper course conducted by the 3d Marine Division at DONG HA. After completing the training the teams were successfully employed in the area of operation as mentioned previously in this report.

2. (U) The program of reciprocal mobile training teams between the 1st ARVN Division and the 101st Airborne Division was continued. Division personnel presented classes to soldiers of the 1st ARVN Division on quick kill techniques and mechanical training on the M-16, M-60 and M-79. They in turn presented periods of instruction to paratroopers on Viet Cong tactics and techniques, mines and booby traps, and methods the enemy uses in marking trails.

3. (C) The 1st Brigade instituted a training program in December to conduct training for and establish liaison/forward

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observer teams with Regional Force companies in the brigade's area of operation. Subjects included terrain appreciation, security operations, the use of supporting fires, defensive operations and blocking and counterattack planning. The object of the training is to enhance the operational capability of the Regional Force companies with the view of enabling them to act more independently in pacification operations.

4. (U) All infantry units conducted extensive training commensurate with time and operational requirements to enable a more rapid adjustment to the rigors of combat of the large number of replacements received early in the reporting period. Emphasis was placed on small unit operations, ambushes, weaponry, airmobile operations, the adjustment of indirect fires and means of reducing diseases and discomfort in a field environment.

5. (U) The 160th Aviation Group conducted three airmobility schools for battalion and brigade commanders, and battalion and brigade S3's and S3 air officers during the reporting period. A total of 75 personnel received instruction in the aviation assets and organization of an airmobile division, and planning for and the conduct of airmobile operations.

6. (U) The Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School at Bien Hoa was augmented to provide necessary processing and training for replacements received during the November-December DIETOS hump. The School was able to accomplish its training mission by organizing the instructors and trainees into two groups with the trainees changing over at noon each day for the five day training period.

D. CHEMICAL

1. (C) Chemical Operations:

a. The Division Chemical section with the 20th and 36th Chemical Detachments and the 10th Chemical Platoon continued a program of chemical support for division operations. The 10th Chemical Platoon provided a bunker seeding team during the period 11-17 November to contaminate approximately fifty bunkers and caves discovered on the NUI TRON Peninsula by elements of the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry. The bunkers and caves had been used by the enemy for protection and storage and at the close of the reporting period were still not inhabitable because of the effects

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of agent CS.

b. Thirteen sorties totaling 382 barrels of CS-1 were dropped during the period 20 November - 2 December on suspected headquarters sites, cache locations and lines of communication of the 5th NVA Regiment. During one sortie a USAF FAC called an immediate air strike on enemy troops moving into a valley to escape the effects of the agent in the adjacent jungle. Sixteen flame sorties were flown against suspected enemy locations including a mortar position. All of these sorties were in support of the 1st Battalion, 3d ARVN Regiment and the 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry which were conducting a combined operation against the 5th NVA. After the operation terminated eleven additional target areas were contaminated with 700 drums of CS-1 dropped from CH-47 helicopters.

c. During Operation RAWLINS VALLEY five areas containing trail networks which could have been used by a withdrawing enemy were contaminated. Two of the areas were contaminated with tactical aircraft dropping BLU 52A/B bombs to take advantage of the longer persistency characteristics of this Air Force munition. The remaining three areas were contaminated by 168 drums of CS-1 dropped by CH-47. The five target areas were screened by the division's cavalry squadron which did not observe enemy movement through the areas.

d. Eight CH-47 helicopters dropped 224 drums of CS-1 in three valley systems in support of Operation TODD FOREST.

2. (C) New Chemical Munitions:

a. The division received the Dispenser and Grenade System, Aircraft, XM27 (ENSURE 230) for evaluation. Five systems including 10 dispensers, 900 XM 54 CS grenades and 15 reload kits were received. After conducting four test drops the system was rated unsatisfactory because the grenades tend to hang up in the tubes due to excessive pressure and a gunship has to give up its armament to carry the system.

b. The division received 15 mines, Anti-personnel, PWP, Pop-up, XM 54 (ENSURE 225) on 30 October 1968 and nine additional mines at a later date for evaluation. By the end of the reporting period three of the mines had been fired for demonstration purposes and the remainder were issued to divisional units for integration in perimeter defenses. Reports of the firings were

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forwarded to the Army Concept Team in Vietnam.

### 3. (C) New Techniques Developed:

a. Flame Operations. The Division Chemical Section and the 10th Chemical Platoon conducted flame drops from CH-47 aircraft using sling loaded 55 gallon drums filled with napalm. Operations preceding this period used a hemp sling containing 10 drums of mixed JP-4 and diesel oil. During the period US Navy nylon cargo nets were obtained which permitted the load capacity to be increased from 10 to 20 drums per sortie. The mix was also changed from JP-4/diesel oil to 10 drums of 1% thickened fuel, 10 drums of 4% thickened fuel. This eliminated the 75% ignition rate experienced with the old mix; all drops have been successfully ignited using the new mix. The combination of the larger net and the new mix provides a 20 minute burn duration and burns out a circular area 100 meters in diameter. This capacity is used to reduce fortifications in support of troops in contact, to clear booby trapped areas, in conjunction with PSYOP loudspeakers, and to prepare closed fire bases for reoccupation by burning rubbish, killing rodents, and detonating booby traps.

b. Airborne Personnel Detector. A recent innovation in the conduct of airborne personnel detector missions involves the immediate reporting of hotspots permitting rapid fire artillery and aerial rocket artillery reaction. When three or more hotspots are recorded in a 15 second period, the coordinates are reported in the clear to Brigade S-3 or Div Arty S-3 and field artillery is called on the suspected enemy locations as soon as the "sniffer" team has cleared the area. This is followed by aerial rocket artillery and skyspots.

c. The total chemical missions during the reporting period are as follows:

CS Drum Drop.....	57 sorties.....	1632 drums
Flame Drop.....	53 sorties.....	754 drums
APD.....	80 missions flown	
Tactical CS (E-158).....	5 sorties.....	61 munitions
Tactical CS (XM 27).....	2 sorties.....	288 grenades
Tactical CS (Grenade rack)....	2 sorties.....	768 grenades
Fougasse Emplacements.....	595	
Bunker Seeding (CS-1).....	2 missions	
Aerial Insecticide.....	20 missions	



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Ground Insecticide..... 52 sorties  
Aerial Defoliation..... 6 sorties  
Ground Defoliation..... 17 sorties  
Showers (FDDA)..... 21 missions.....1627 personnel  
Protective Mask Inspection.... 48 missions.....4933 masks  
CMMI..... 25

E. INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) During the reporting period the following information was compiled on the enemy situation:

a. At the beginning of this reporting period, the C114, C115, C116, C117, C118 and C119 LF Co's each had a strength of approximately 30 men and had a limited ability to conduct offensive actions. The C113 LF Co, with a strength of approx 100 men, was the one exception and was considered a fully combat effective unit. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion, with a strength of approximately 300 men, was also a fully combat effective unit. The 5th NVA Regiment, with an estimated strength of approximately 2000 men, was located in its traditional BA south of Nui Ke (YD 7606) and was considered combat effective. However, allied operations had kept the regiment off balance and it was not capable of launching a large scale, coordinated attack. The 4th NVA Regiment, with an estimated strength of 900, had been forced by Allied operations to move to southern Phu Loc (D) and it was not capable of large scale offensive action. The 9th Battalion, 90th Regiment, with the strength of approximately 250 men, was fully combat effective and was operating with the 09 Co, 1810th Battalion, and the C115 LF Co in the Huong Tra Mountains. The 803d and 6th Regiments each having an estimated strength of approximately 1600 men, were believed to be located in the vicinity of BA 611. The 9th Regiment was believed to be located in the A Loiu Valley or in BA 611.

b. One of the most significant developments during the reporting period was the increased enemy supply activity throughout Thua Thien Province. The enemy's rear service activities in the Ruong Ruong area, which were first noticed in mid-October 1968, continued throughout the reporting period. Cultivated fields, large caves, huts, and elephants were sighted in this area. Sniffer and SLAR have indicated that materiel is moved north and northeast from Ruong Ruong to the 4th and 5th Regiments. Additionally, SLAR has indicated that materiel is moved east from Ruong Ruong through the Elephant Valley to Oung Nam (P). SLAR and VR have revealed increased traffic through the A Chau

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on Route 548. As a response to the many interdictions on Route 547A, the enemy is apparently moving supplies east from the A Shau to the Rao Nai Valley and north through this valley to the Delta Junction area (YD 5403). SLAR, sniffer, and VR have indicated considerable activity along this route and in the Delta Junction area.

c. During December and January sniffer and VR indicated considerable traffic in BA 114 especially along the Rao Trang River in the vicinity of the junction of the Song Bo and Rao Trang Rivers (YD 517125).

d. A document taken from the body of an NVA officer killed at YD 418204 on 1 January 1969, revealed that he was a member of the 806th Battalion, 6th Regiment. Thus, it is possible that forward elements of the 6th Regiment moved into BA 114 in mid December 1968. Additionally, documents captured during an operation in the vicinity YD 328204 identified the 806th Battalion, 6th Regiment. The documents revealed that the C2 Co, 6th Regiment, was to receive orders on 28 January 1969. The return of elements of the 6th Regiment to Thua Thien (P) with the apparent intention of initiating operations is one of the most significant developments of the reporting period.

e. During the reporting period, the enemy attempted to re-establish his influence in the lowlands of Phu Vang (D), Phu Thu (D), and Phu Loc (D). In December 1968, there were numerous small contacts along the canal in Phu Vang (D)/ Phu Thu (D) from vicinity YD 8142 to vicinity YD 8423. FW and agent reports indicated that elements of the 804th Battalion, 5th Regiment were operating in both Phu Thu (D) and Phu Vang (D). Additionally, there was increased activity along the Truoi River immediately south of Highway 1. FW reports revealed that elements of the K4C Bn, 4th Regiment and the 804th Battalion, 5th Regiment were collecting rice in this area and that elements of the K4C Battalion planned to destroy the Truoi River Bridge.

f. In mid January 1969, the K4B Battalion attempted to renew its influence in the lowlands of Phu Loc (D), but was thwarted by several successful ambushes conducted by 2-327 Infantry vicinity ZD 1810 and ZD 1610. Documents captured from 16 NVA killed in one of these ambushes indicated that the K4B Battalion planned to upgrade to sapper status and that squad sized elements of the K4B Battalion would attack An Bang (H), ZD 145005, Nuoc Ngot (H), ZD 152010, and Phu Gai (H), AU 824010.

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g. In January, there was a sharp increase of enemy initiated actions, including stand-off attacks by fire and probing of perimeters. Camp Eagle was attacked with 122mm rockets on 12 January 1969, Camp Evans received four 122mm rockets on 12 January 1969, and Phu Loc District Headquarters received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, 20-25 B40 rockets, and 15-20 grenades.

h. At the close of the period, the local force companies and the Phu Loc Armed Battalion retained approximately the same strength and capabilities which they possessed on 1 November 1968. The one exception is the C116, which increased its strength to approximately 50 men. The 5th Regiment's strength also remained at about the same level throughout the reporting period. Allied operations west and southwest of Leech Island in late January 1969 precluded the 5th Regiment's launching of a coordinated, large scale attack. The 4th Regiment, which suffered light casualties from ambushes, still had a strength of 900 men at the end of the reporting period. The 4th Regiment seems to have taken an offensive posture in areas near Phu Loc (D) HQ and the Truoi River Bridge. The 90th Regt and the 803d Regt were unlocated. The 6th Regt, with a strength of approximately 1100 men, had returned to vic YD 3020 and probably had forward elements in BA 114. The 9th Regt with an estimated strength of 1300 men, remains in vicinity BA 611 or A Luoi and has the capability of reinforcing the 4th Regt and the 5th Regt.

### 2. (C) G-2 Operations:

a. Sensor Devices: During the period 29-30 December 1968, the Division emplaced 32 HANDSIDS and 10 MAGIDS into Base Area 114 in order to detect enemy infiltration along the RAO TRANG - SONG BO River into the coastal plains and HUE area. Since 30 December there have been 59 positive activations, of which 24 have been enemy forces of platoon size. The other 35 activations varied in sized from 1 to 15 men. Out of 59 positive activations the sensor readings confirmed other intelligence reports that the RAO TRANG - SONG BO River in BA 114 was being used by the enemy as one of its main infiltration routes into the coastal plains and the HUE area. Only 3 activations have been received between the hours of 2400 to 0630 hours. The remaining activations have been taking place between the hours of 1100-1700 and 1900-2315. It should be noted that the enemy will attempt to move during daylight hours whenever friendly units are not operating in the general vicinity of the sensor field. The majority of

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the night movement took place between the hours of 1900-2300. It appears that the enemy will move as soon as darkness arrives and does not usually operate during the early morning hours. All positive activations were engaged with artillery or 81mm mortars.

b. G-2 Air: During the reporting period, the G2 Air Section conducted routine aerial surveillance and reconnaissance activities of the Division AO in support of operations. The reporting period covers two significant improvements in the G2 Air Section which will certainly aid future operations. These are:

(1) Night surveillance Mission: Coordination between G2 Air and the 521st River Division (PER) has greatly improved the surveillance of coastal waterways in the Division AO. Patrol craft and the G2 Air night observation device (NOD) mission in the TAM GIANG and THUY TU inland waterways have resulted in an increased surveillance of illicit sampan traffic during the evening hours. The NOD mission is flown on an irregular schedule depending upon moon rise and moon set each particular evening. As a result of this mission several sampans have been destroyed and one VCI captured.

(2) Hand-held Photography Program: The addition of a photo processing capability to the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section now allows for a responsive hand-held photography program. An M-109 was acquired. It contains photographic processing equipment necessary to begin a limited hand-held program. The transfer of three photographic personnel from the 501st Signal Battalion to the II Section made the program a reality. On several occasions the section has produced the hand-held photography and the supporting supplementary intelligence report in less than twenty-four hours. This time frame has proven that the program will be responsive enough to meet the tactical needs of the requestors.

c. Counterintelligence (CI) Section: During the reporting period the Counterintelligence Section established two new sections which will aid in the internal security of the Division and a third section to improve the passing of VCI information between the GVN Agencies and the Division.

(1) Base Camp Security Team: During this reporting period it was noted that the Division was employing an increasing number of indigenous personnel. The large number of indigenous employees,

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in addition to the number of ARVN personnel attached to the Division, greatly increased the possibility of the enemy using these individuals to perpetrate acts of terrorism against US personnel or acts of sabotage of US equipment. To minimize the threat posed by the indigenous labor and the threat of penetration of the Division area by the enemy dressed as ARVN personnel, the Base Camp Security Team was established. The team is responsible for:

(a) Monitoring established screening, search and control procedures of the local nationals.

(b) Establishing and operating an informant system among the indigenous labor force.

(c) Assisting the Labor Officer in processing Military Security Service (MSS) security clearances for local national employees.

(d) Conducting periodic security inspections of troop congested areas and facilities for explosives.

(e) Conducting liaison with the units/offices responsible for the security of division base areas: Provost Marshal, Labor Officer, Base Defense Coordinator. Through the efforts of the Base Camp Security Team, increased command emphasis has been directed toward the indigenous labor problem. The Labor Office has been established and considerable progress has been made toward acquiring MSS clearances for the Division's indigenous employees.

(2) Special Operations Team: During this reporting period, it was noted that there was a need for a team with the capability of servicing and repairing damaged security containers. In addition, numerous containers were locked and their combinations lost. To meet the need for servicing the containers, the Special Operations Team was created. The team has the capability of forcibly opening locked containers and repairing damaged containers. The team has a further mission of conducting special sensitive investigations regarding activities in the division which should not be construed as subversive, but could represent a potential threat to good order and discipline. Investigations of this type center around Division personnel who are members of or participate in the activities of dissent, anti-war, or anti-Vietnam type organizations. As stated, individuals or organizations of this type are in most cases not considered subversive but do pose a threat to order and discipline. The activities of these individuals and organizations must be carefully watched and are of definite command and Counterintelligence interest.

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(3) Political Order of Battle Section (POB): During this reporting period it was realized that a distinct information gap existed between Division Headquarters and the GVN agencies responsible for the identification and elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in THUA THIEN Province. In order to close this gap and to provide the Division Headquarters with the necessary VCI information, the POB Section was established. The Section is manned by two CI agents and one ARVN officer. The functions of the section are:

- (a) Prepare VCI estimates.
- (b) Report the date, time and location of province and district operations targeted against the VCI.
- (c) Preparation of VCI identification reports.
- (d) Preparation of VCI elimination reports.
- (e) Conducting liaison with GVN agencies responsible for VCI identification and elimination.
- (f) Other tasks regarding VCI, as directed by the Chief of the CI section or G2.

3. (U) Weather: During this reporting period the following precipitation data was compiled:

	<u>MIN</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>MAX</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
NOV 68	5.0	23.0	48.0	10.49
DEC 68	1.0	9.15	30.0	1.72
JAN 69	0.2	7.1	11.7	9.94

**F. PERSONNEL**

1. (U) During the months of November, December and January the CI Section was primarily concerned with the functioning of the system for processing personnel into and out of the Division during the DEROS impact.

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2. (U) During late November - early December, more than 6,000 Division personnel rotated from RVN to COMUS for further assignment or to terminate their military service. It was necessary during the period to quickly out-process these individuals, provide the best service possible so that the personnel departing knew of the Division's interest in them, and in-processing a similar number of troops so that the fighting ability of the Division would not be impaired. To this end, by staying within the Commanding General's authority to approve seven day DEROS adjustments for travel purpose, a maximum of 200 troops per day were out-processed at Bien Hoa. At the same time, processing teams were augmented to handle the increased flow of personnel both into and out of the Division. Processing was thus accomplished efficiently and effectively.

### C. LOGISTICS

1. (U) General: During the reported period (1 November 1968 to 31 December 1969) DISCOM continued normal logistical functions in support of divisional elements participating in Operation Nevada Eagle. With the exception of the 3d Forward Service Support Element (FSSE) no change in unit disposition occurred. The 3d FSSE displaced from Camp Eagle to Camp Evans, along with the division's 3d Brigade and its combat support element on 31 October 1968. The FSSE main body closed with advance elements of the 3d Brigade and commenced logistical support operations on 2 November 1968.

#### 2. (U) Maintenance:

a. During the reporting period the Maintenance Section of the 5th Transportation Battalion (AMTS) conducted pre-CMI of division aviation units. These were working visits and provided assistance and advice pertaining to supply, safety, publications, maintenance management and maintenance operations procedures. The battalion also initiated monthly maintenance and supply seminars to provide a direct exchange of information. A newsletter is published periodically to supplement the seminars. On 1 January 1969, B Company Technical Supply became operational and issued 2,481 lines from its ASL and 39 lines from its fringe stock.

#### b. 801st Maintenance Battalion:

(1) During the month of December, the 801st Maintenance Battalion designed management tools and procedures to ensure an accurate and complete reconciliation of all open job orders and Red Ball requisitions on a weekly basis. In addition, a system was designed to analyze daily shop output.

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(2) Liaison with supported units was improved by direct contact, weekly meetings and a monthly newsletter. These actions have improved maintenance and supply operations.

(3) The number of lines on the Main Support Company ASL was reduced from approximately 11,000 to 6,000 by the turn-in of non-demand repair parts. During December and January, 77 CONEX of these items were retrograded to Okinawa. This action has improved the support rendered to units within the Division because the current number of lines is more easily managed.

(4) During December and January, the maintenance backlog in battalion shops was significantly reduced, especially in the Electronics Platoon where work orders were reduced from 600 in November to 400 in January. The reduction is attributed to more efficient shop operations and the maximum use of the MRE and Red Ball systems.

### 3. (U) Supply:

a. When the division deployed to ICTZ in March 1968 there was a deficiency in adequate supply stocks in non-divisional support elements. Efforts to improve the stockage level resulted in an overflow and a saturation point was reached in December. Action was then taken to reduce stockage levels to manageable proportions. Excesses were identified and 78 CONEX and 168 boxes of various Class II and IV items were retrograded.

b. The Central Issue Facility of the 426th S&S Battalion located at Division Rear at Bien Hoa was closed in December. This facility has supplied items of TA 50-901 equipment to replacements who had not been issued certain items at the CIF of the 90th Replacement Battalion. Since both of these facilities drew TA 50-901 items from the same source, coordination was made with the 90th Replacement Battalion to consolidate existing stocks, thus terminating the requirement for the facility at Bien Hoa. This action made more personnel and equipment available for employment in the division forward area.

c. A consolidated refuel pad for all UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters was completed at Camp Eagle in mid-January. This pad provides Class III support for helicopters located in division aviation units at the division base camp.

d. The Division Supply Office initiated a program to determine onhand assets and shortages of mission-essential major items of



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equipment. This information together with authorization data provides the DSO with the tools to manage effectively the assets in the Division. It also provides density information necessary to establish management criteria for materials related to end items.

4. (U) Transportation.

a. The Division received 18,641.16 short tons of supplies aboard SEALIFT vessels.

b. Aircraft sorties supported the Division as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO (S/T)</u>
November	1,410	11,035	3,705
December	2,076	15,203	3,045
January	<u>2,099</u>	<u>11,910</u>	<u>3,502</u>
Total	5,585	38,148	10,252

H. CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. (C) Because combat operations created an environment favorable for civic action activities in the bulk of the populated areas of the 101st Airborne Division AO, the Division Civic Action Program was greatly expanded during the reporting period. The average number of major civic action projects increased from about 15 at the beginning of the period to about 50 at the close of the period.

2. (C) In execution of the mission assigned by J1J NAF of coordinating all military civic action in the Division area, G5 met regularly and closely monitored activities of all military units engaged in civic action work. These include Navy, Seabee, Marine, and non-divisional Army units. Illustrative of the type coordination accomplished is the Province-wide MEDCAP program in which all MEDCAP's have been integrated into a single overall program designed to provide optimum coverage on a scheduled, recurring basis. This program was coordinated with the Province medical director to insure that Vietnamese nurses, etc., are present during each MEDCAP to learn, assist, and maintain records.

3. (C) In developing its civic action program the Division was guided primarily by the Province Chief's pacification plan --

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specifically the Accelerated Pacification Campaign which, like the present reporting period, ran from 1 November - 31 January. Support provided by the Division has been closely coordinated with appropriate Vietnamese and US officials and agencies. Requirements for assistance were determined by conducting surveys in each District with District and Village officials. Coordination with other Vietnamese and US agencies involved in civic action work was made to determine what they were doing to meet the needs of each District. Division assistance was then tailored to fill gaps on each project so that the Division program complemented and supplemented what others were doing but did not duplicate or compete with their efforts. On almost every project which the Division assisted, at least one other agency also provided assistance; also on virtually all projects the labor was provided by the local people.

4. (C) Throughout the AO the confidence of the people in the GVN is clearly evident. Some 37,000 people driven from their hamlets during the '68 TET Offensive returned to their homes during the past Fall to rebuild. Especially in the Accelerated Pacification areas new homes emerged from the rubble of war and fields which were not planted the past year were under cultivation.

5. (U) Several major projects of particular note were completed during this reporting period: The Tay Loc Orphanage on 1 November 1968, Phu Cam School on 8 November 1968, the Duong Mong School on 2 December, and the Gia Le Chapel on 12 January 1969. The opening ceremony and dedication of the An Luu School was held on 20 December 1968 with the Minister of Information making the dedication address. Brigadier General Burdett, ADC (O), represented the 101st Airborne Division at the opening ceremonies of the Le Loi Primary School on 18 January 1969. A total of 1 school, 3 orphanages, 2 major miscellaneous projects, initiated during the previous reporting period, were completed.

6. (U) Current projects initiated during the period, include 13 schools, 6 hospitals/dispensaries, and 25 other high impact projects.

7. (U) Projects started and completed during the period include 3 schools, 2 orphanages, 2 hospitals, and 8 other major projects.

8. (U) In December 1968, the Division CA officer visited MACCORDS in Saigon in an effort to obtain money to purchase cultivators needed to restore land in the primary pacification areas of Thua Thien Province. As a result, 2,000,000 \$VN was loaned to the

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Province Chief through the Minister of Revolutionary Development to purchase the cultivators. In early January, 14 Kubota 200 tillers were purchased and delivered to Thua Thien Province.

9. (U) Approximately 11,000 toys were distributed thru units S5's to the District Chiefs of Thua Thien Province for their Christmas parties.

10. (U) Fourteen thousand TET booklets were received, assembled and distributed throughout the Division. The booklets give a good explanation of TET. It also gives the soldier a better understanding and the do's and don'ts of the Vietnamese New Year.

11. (U) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

Masonite/Plywood/Asbestos	582 Sheets
Tin	661 Sheets
Tile	12,397 Tiles
Rebar	264 Meters
Cement	1,108 Bags
Sand	293 Cubic Meters
Gravel	28 Cubic Meters
Construction Lumber	18,746 Board Feet
Scrap Lumber	124,691 Board Feet
Food	143,941 Lbs
Clothing	7,971 Lbs
Soap	3,955 Lbs
Toys	11,000 Each
MEDCAPS	313 MEDCAPS
Patients Treated	36,831 Patients
Medical Supplies	1,425 Supplies

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### I. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

#### 1. (U) Statistics.

Quantity and type of propaganda media employed.

Leaflets disseminated - 54,040,975.

Loudspeaker broadcasts - 702 hours.

Movies shown - 82 hours.

TV Programs conducted - 13

2. (U) Standard Chieu Hoi tapes and leaflets were employed to the maximum extent possible during this reporting period. Standard leaflets and tape recorded messages were used as developed by JUSPAO and the 7th PSYOP Bn. In addition to this standard procedure, live and taped messages and leaflets showing a picture of the Hoi Chanh have been made whereby each Hoi Chanh who rallies to 101st Airborne Division units is timely exploited. Coordination has been established with adjacent military and GVN elements to provide them with our organic loudspeaker capabilities. Feedback from Hoi Chanh's indicates reception from helicopter loudspeakers is easily understood and has influenced them in their decision to rally.

3. (U) Propaganda was disseminated to drive a wedge between the NVA and local populace and present the feeling that the NVA is an invading force seeking to dominate the people of South Vietnam. PSYOP media was used to create dissension between VC and NVA soldiers. Additionally, peace talks were exploited to encourage the NVA to take less risks as peace may be near.

4. (U) PSYOP was employed to encourage the local populace to support the GVN and to present the idea that supporting the government shortens the war. Light mobile loudspeaker teams have been used in conjunction with the Medical Civic Action Programs whereby credit is given to the GVN for making this program available to the civilians. In conjunction with MEDCAPs, propaganda teams show movies and pre-recorded taped messages oriented toward pro GVN and Chieu Hoi themes. Photographs have been made of 101st Civic Action Projects and leaflets prepared with the caption: "This is what the GVN and Allied Forces are doing for you - What is the VC doing?".

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5. (C) A total of 97 Hoi Chanhs rallied to GVN and Allied Forces within the Division AO. Increased emphasis in the Chieu Hoi appeal was placed on the VC/NVA disillusionment and his increasing burden of hardships, especially sickness and the lack of food. This approach was based on intelligence information gathered within the Division AO. There has been an increase in the percentage of Hoi Chanhs rallying with Safe Conduct Passes and rally instructions.

6. (U) Numerous broadcasts were conducted exploiting the bombing halt by the President's order.

7. (U) The use of cultural drama teams during cordon operations have been well received by the local populace. There were a total of seven (7) performances by these teams during this reporting period.

8. (U) During the period 21-27 November Armed Propaganda Teams were used extensively in Phu Loc District along with one (1) Audio-Visual Team and two (2) loudspeaker vehicles which placed special emphasis on the Voluntary Informant Program (Tim Sung Giac). All vehicles were marked with prominent banners to designate them as Tim Sung Giac vehicles. Counterintelligence team members paid rewards for valid information. As a result of this activity, crew-served weapons, large amounts of ammunition, and reports of VC activity in the area were turned in. The Tim Sung Giac (VIP) was further exploited by utilization of 9th SCS aircraft, Division organic aircraft, ground loudspeaker teams, Armed Propaganda Teams, and through the distribution of leaflets to line troops for dissemination to the local populace in their areas of operations. A total of 40 reward payments were made under the VIP.

9. (U) The Division assisted in the production of a weekly 60-minute television program at the Hue television studio.

10. (U) There were 3 known incidents of enemy propaganda being employed.

a. On 18 January a leaflet was found in a bundle of clothing at the main gate laundry of LZ Sally with an anti-US/Vietnamese war theme encouraging US soldiers not to die for the benefit of US warlords and not to go to the battlefield to die. "Why should you die in Johnson's aggressive war?"

b. On 19 January, B/1/501 found a leaflet in an abandoned house in the vicinity YD 866234 calling for the American Negroes to unite with the Vietnamese people in the struggle against a common enemy,

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the US ruling circles who simultaneously are intensifying their war of aggression against the Vietnamese people and carrying out the policy of racial discrimination back home.

c. On 3 January, 2/327 found a leaflet entitled, A HEAVY DEFEAT OF THE U.S., during a village sweep in the vicinity of ZD 2001. The leaflet stated the US had to stop unconditionally the bombing on the whole territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam because over the past 4 years the North has successfully fought back all the US offensive, down 3243 modern US aircraft, killed and captured thousands of "seasoned" pilot pirates and grown steadier than ever in all fields. It further called upon the American GI to protest the US presence in Vietnam and to refuse to fight.

J. MEDICAL

1. (C) Operations.

a. The 326th Medical Battalion continued its Medical Support of the 101st Airborne Division, with the same allocations of its assets to the divisional units, as in the previous quarters. The major operation supported during the reporting period continued to be Operation Nevada Eagle. The enemy activity in the Division's Area of Operation continued to be extremely light and the battalion persisted with its efforts in the MEDCAP II Program. The local medical personnel and resources were integrated into an active role on these MEDCAPs. The emphasis on the MEDCAP II Program continues and a formalized, routinely scheduled program has evolved for the hamlets within the Division's Area of Responsibility.

b. Support Company which remained at Bien Hoa, had a significant increase in its workload, due to the retention of the majority of the division's personnel back to CONUS during the months of November and December. The responsibility of providing medical care and treatment for these personnel and the numerous incoming replacement personnel, was the major undertaking for this unit during the last quarter.

c. Medical Statistics Recapitulation:

Total patients seen at clearing station. . . . .	10,123
Total dental patients. . . . .	2,406
Total admissions . . . . .	566

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Total transferred. . . . . 467

RECAPITULATION

IRHA . . . . . 110

NBC. . . . . 802

MEDICAL DISEASES

Malaria. . . . . 33

FUO's. . . . . 186

Diarrhea . . . . . 187

Skin Diseases. . . . . 488

N/P. . . . . 372

Gastroenteritis. . . . . 135

Foot Problems. . . . . 253

Head Injuries. . . . . 78

VD . . . . . 470

Med Evac Missions. . . . . 509

Med Cap II total number of persons treated . . . . . 733

d. The Division Medical Supply Office filled over 92 percent of requests during the period. The average weekly number of line items filled was 275; the high weekly total for the period was 472 line items. The total number of line items stocked was 923.

e. Battalion Medical Services:

(1) The Air Ambulance Platoon:

(a) The platoon has reached its full strength of twenty-five officers with the arrival of eight new officers and warrant officers during this period.

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(b) The delivery of five new aircraft during the period brought the platoon to its authorized TOE strength of 12 UH-1H helicopters. All of the aircraft are being equipped with hoists, which are in critical demand for operations.

(c) The Air Ambulance Platoon is also carrying on operations to familiarize its aviators with all types of operations. In an experiment during the month of December, the platoon sent five aviators to Dust-Off units in the south. The flight time accumulated during this period not only helped the officers become more familiar with the aircraft but also exposed them to varied techniques of flight.

### (2) Mental Hygiene Consultation Service:

(a) During this period the number of individuals interviewed at the Division Mental Hygiene Consultation Service increased considerably. The increase was more substantial during the months of November and December. There was a great number of individuals exhibiting characteristics of the so called "ten months syndrome" or preferably "shortness anxiety", meaning the anxiety (apprehension, inability to sleep, restlessness, poor appetite, and fear of death), experienced mainly by individuals of 11F series and by individuals of the support area that had three months or less left in Vietnam.

(b) During this period the Division MHCS supported all of the Phu Bai area. It is the only MHCS in this area and the support was provided to all branches of the armed forces.

(3) Optometry: During the reporting period the Optometry Section was assigned by TOE to the Medical Battalion and "A" Company, 326th Medical Battalion. Due to the lack of buildings in the new area, the section remained inoperative until the beginning of December. However, an additional clinic was established at LZ Sally, in the meanwhile, to support patients from the Division's 2d and 3d Brigades. This clinic is operated on a three day a week basis. The second authorized optometrist arrived in division in the latter part of December. Through future recommendations for TOE equipment changes and the creating of new field optometry techniques which will evolve, the division level optometry will continue to be a tremendous asset to the Divisional Units. The number of valuable combat man-hours saved in the short operational period of the Division's Optometry Clinics substantiates this fact.



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K. SIGNAL

(C) During the reporting period, the 501st Signal Battalion participated in Operations Nevada Eagle, Rawlins Valley, Todd Forest, Sherman Peak, and was in a standby status for Operation Flatte Canyon. The command and control communications provided in support of the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters and its major subordinate units consisted of the following: very high frequency (VHF) multichannel telephone communications down to battalion level; high frequency (HF) radio teletypewriter service; communications center facilities; messenger service; telephone switching centrals including a non-TOE AN/MTC-1; single sideband radio wire integration (SSB RWI) service and frequency modulated (FM) secure and non-secure radio communications. The Signal Battalion provided public address systems on 56 occasions which included the presentation of the Presidential Unit Citation by General Abrams, the arrival of BG Allen, and the Martha Raye Show. A new underground cable plant and installation of the MTC-0 (9-position switchboard) will provide faster pick-up time, better quality, and higher trunking capacity to surrounding areas when totally completed. On 21 January 1969 the MTC-9 was cut over. The Camp Eagle cable plant distribution has not been cut over, but 4.5% of the truck circuits on the 200 pair cable to Phu Bai are now operational.

L. ENGINEER

(U) Operations:

a. The battalion continued to provide general support for the division. Four new fire bases, Rakkasan, Helen, Bayonet, and Dagger, were constructed and approximately two hundred new bunkers and other structures were built on previously occupied areas. With assistance from non-divisional engineer units, the battalion was responsible for the daily minesweeps of 138 kilometers of road in the division area of operations. Numerous teams were provided for LZ clearing and demolition missions in support of tactical operations.

b. Headquarters Company was in general support of the Division for the duration of the reporting period. Because the heavy equipment is consolidated in Headquarters Company, they were responsible for all equipment support in the Division's area of operations. The following equipment was provided:

D7 bulldozer	504 hours
D5A bulldozer	2160 hours

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M450 bulldozer - 720 hours  
Cat 112F grader - 1728 hours  
2½ yard front loader - 1512 hours  
3414 wheel loader - 1296 hours

The headquarters element was responsible for producing potable water; conducting surveys; designing structures; conducting reconnaissance missions of bridges, roads, and potential fire bases; and controlling a continual dust suppression operation.

c. The battalion actively sought civic action projects provided they did not conflict with combat support operations. The major project was coordinated jointly with the District Chiefs of Huong Thuy and Phu Vang Districts in support of a resettlement area. The project consisted of constructing an Eiffel bridge (YD 795250), a timber trestle bridge (YD 808247) and a road along a canal east of Hue (YD 786242) to (YD 823259). The Eiffel bridge was constructed from 7 to 25 November in cooperation with the Department of Public Works. The road and the 72 foot timber trestle bridge were constructed during the period 5 to 31 December. The total project required approximately 2500 man-hours. In addition to the resettlement project the battalion also assisted the local populace by renovating a school near Truoi (YD 972062) and a school and dispensary near Nuoc Ngot bridge (ZD 165010).

M. ARMY AVIATION

1. (U) The 160th Aviation Group provided general support for the division including combat assaults, wholesale logistical resupply by CH-47 helicopters, retail logistical resupply by UH-1H helicopters, command and control aircraft, artillery dismountment, convoy escort, reconnaissance and surveillance, administrative support, NOB missions, psychological operations, flame and CS drops, and medical evacuation.

2. (U) Statistics:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HRS FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C RECOVERIES</u>
101st AHB	16,237	51,339	76,083	1,618	0
159th ASHB	5,791	23,341	63,028	33,991	30
163d Avn Co	<u>2,010</u>	<u>5,512</u>	<u>18,450</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
GP TOTALS	24,038	80,192	157,561	35,609	30

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3. (U) Units of the 160th Aviation Group participated in 147 combat assaults and 25 artillery displacements of at least battery size.

4. (U) Thirty nine incidents of ground fire were recorded. Identification of incidents by type of mission is as follows:

	<u>UH-1</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>CH-54</u>
Armed escort	11	0	0
Armed helicopter close support	10	0	0
Troop carrier operation	4	0	0
Logistical resupply	2	5	2
Other (FCB)	5	0	0

5. (C) Aircraft losses during the period were:

Damaged        27 UH-1H        1 UH-1C

Destroyed      3 UH-1H

Twenty four UH-1H were damaged during combat operations and one UH-1H was destroyed during a combat operation. The remaining losses were incurred during non-combat operations.

6. (U) Maintenance:

a. Aircraft maintenance:

(1) The maintenance concept of the 101st AHB is the performance of organizational and direct support maintenance within each company through the organic service platoon and the attached KE Teams. General Order 607, Hqs, USARPAC, Dated 11 October 1968, and Ltr, Hqs, 160th Avn Gp, Subject: Activation of Units, Dated 5 November 1968, authorized activation of the following Transportation Detachments, Aircraft Maintenance:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MTOE</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>ATTACHED</u>
499 TC Det (DS)	KE55-570G	50	Co A, 101st Avn Bn
501 TC Det (DS)	KE55-570G	50	Co B, 101st Avn Bn
516 TC Det (DS)	KE55-570G	50	Co C, 101st Avn Bn
527 TC Det (DS)	KE55-570G	38	Co D, 101st Avn Bn

(2) Upon activation of the KE Teams, initial personnel requirements had to be drawn from the supported unit assets, conversely affecting maintenance capabilities at the organizational level. During the period from 5 November to the present, this unfavorable situation has gradually been resolved through personnel gains within the supported companies and the attached KE Teams. However, a critical shortage still exists in the area of key personnel; i.e., maintenance supervisors and qualified technical inspectors, due to the recent conversion from UH-1C to AH-1G mechanics.

(3) MTOE equipment for the KE Teams has been extremely slow in being issued. At the present time there is less than fifteen (15) percent fill of TOE items. The most critical items affecting the maintenance effort are the shortages of avionics test equipment, T53-L19 engine special tools, generator sets, M60 3-ton wheel mounted crane, and authorized vehicles.

(4) Maintenance facilities are steadily improving through individual unit self-help programs. Building of an aircraft maintenance hanger is now in progress in Company A. Expected completion date is 15 March 1969. Ground survey for a maintenance hanger has been completed at Company B with a tentative building start date of 20 February 1969. At the present time there are no scheduled plans or priorities for building starts for C and D Companies.

(5) Back up Direct Support Maintenance is provided to the 499th and 510th Transportation Detachments by Company A, 5th Transportation Bn (AMS) and back up support to the 516th and 527th Transportation Detachments is provided by Company B, 5th Transportation Battalion. During this report period maintenance support from the 5th Transportation Battalion has greatly improved in all areas. Company B, 5th Transportation Battalion became operational during this period; however, support was interrupted for a time due to their relocation at Phu Bai.

b. Aircraft Technical Supply,

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(1) Aircraft tech supply continues to be slow in response. EDP items are generally received on a timely basis including AH-1G parts. Some AH-1G parts, however, have been EDP for as long as 28 days. This is extremely excessive.

(2) A major problem will continue to exist in the area of AH-1G parts due to the small amount of authorized line items (160) on the unit's ASL. The ASL was computed in accordance with AR 711-16 and allowance factors in applicable parts manual. Until such time that sufficient demand data is accumulated to support additions to the ASL, or a directive authorizing additional stockage, it is anticipated that the EDP rate for AH-1G aircraft will continue to rise.

7. (U) In this reporting period there has been a constant increase in air traffic activities and a continual rise in the traffic count maintained by Eagle Tower. This rise in the traffic count reflects all aviation activity in the Camp Eagle area and can be considered relevant to aircraft density and Division Operations. The traffic count to eliminate the subsequent hazards of high density the 160th Aviation Group prepared an air traffic control regulation which has since been published as Division Regulation 95-1. This regulation imposes restrictions on traffic patterns and altitudes, delineates lanes and helipads within Camp Eagle and establishes positive air traffic control procedures. In addition to tower control of aircraft a radar approach has been established for Camp Eagle and operators are presently being prepared for certification.

8. (U) The 160th Group sponsored a self-help project for the Huoc Nghet orphanage in Hue. Materials for the project were provided by the group or by Division G5, and supervision insured they were used for the intended purpose. The expansion and improvement projects are completed and the group continues to help by donating food and educational supplies.

#### N. INFORMATION

(U) Six issues of the division bi-monthly newspaper The Screaming Eagle were printed and distributed. The quarterly issue of the division magazine was prepared for publication in February. Two thousand five hundred thirty nine home news releases were submitted to the Home Town News Center. Ninety-three percent of these were processed and distributed by the Center.

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**SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED**

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### II. Section 2, lessons learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

#### A. PER. COMBI

##### (U) Out Processing of Personnel.

a. Observation: During the months of November and December 1968, over 6,000 officers and men rotated out of the Division for return to CONUS.

b. Evaluation: As a way of showing appreciation for their sacrifices, directions were given for out-processing troops which, when executed, provided services beyond those normally expected during out-processing. Personnel services included 24 hour laundry service, extended hours of operation for barber and tailor shops, expanded entertainment, presentation of awards, and provision of top quality uniform accouterments. The effect as expected was that the individuals departing the Division felt that the Division was concerned about them and genuinely appreciative of their service. An additional benefit was that those personnel being processed into the Division could see the fine treatment being given the troops they were replacing. Observing the fine send-off given to the departing personnel could only have a positive effect.

c. Recommendation: These procedures are an excellent means of expressing gratitude for services performed to personnel returning to CONUS. Other units who may be faced with a similar situation should plan well in advance out-processing procedures.

#### B. OPERATIONS

##### 1. (C) Relocation of Ambush Sites.

a. Observation: The enemy normally uses the same route to enter and to depart a hamlet area.

b. Evaluation: Enemy units reconnoiter and secure routes into populated areas. After completing their mission they will frequently use the same route for withdrawal because they did not encounter friendly ambushes while entering the area.

c. Recommendation: Units be prepared to move their ambushes if the enemy is observed moving along a route which by-passes the established position.

##### 2. (C) Use of 90mm BR for Night Ambushes:

a. Observation: There is a need for additional close support for night ambushes.

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b. Evaluation: It was discovered that the enemy frequently positions fire support elements to cover the party that is designated to enter a hamlet. Often upon hearing the approaching enemy element, friendly forces received RIF and B-40 rocket fire from the enemy supporting position. By employing the 90mm RR, friendly ambush positions could not only immediately engage the ambushed force but could also place effective fires on the supporting force out to 400 meters. The beehive round was found extremely effective when used on withdrawing enemy troops.

c. Recommendation: That 90mm RR with beehive rounds be used on night ambushes for additional fire support.

### 3. (C) Pursuit of Enemy Following Night Ambushes:

a. Observation: An immediate pursuit must be made following night ambushes to locate those enemy personnel who have been wounded or have hidden in the contact area.

b. Evaluation: It has been found that enemy personnel not killed outright in the initial fires of the ambush will attempt to conceal themselves in the immediate area of the contact. These individuals have been located and killed or captured by units employing immediate illumination and using fire and maneuver to sweep the battlefield. Also, if conducted thoroughly and aggressively for a great enough distance this practice will re-establish contact or will reveal bodies which the fleeing enemy has attempted to drag off. Possession of these bodies is not only important for the morale of friendly troops, but also makes it possible for the local population to identify the enemy dead for intelligence purposes.

c. Recommendations: All units be instructed to make immediate, thorough, and aggressive sweeps of contact areas with instructions to regain contact: failing that, they should search the area for enemy personnel, weapons, equipment, and documents.

### 4. (C) Operations in the Mountains.

a. Observation: When operating in the mountains in the dense jungle, the enemy generally travels trails at night and hides near them in the day.

b. Evaluation: Companies moving along trails should drop off an ambush team along the trails leading into the area to be worked. Approximately 1 platoon would be involved in day and night ambushes. The remainder of the company would conduct search and clear operations. Personnel in ambush positions must be constantly alert



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because the targets are usually fleeting.

c. Recommendation: Companies operating in mountainous terrain should use one platoon to establish ambushes along trails to engage enemy units on the move and to provide security for the company (-).

### 5. (U) BBT Removal.

a. Observation: The nose plug of the 175mm and 8 inch Howitzer rounds with a small portion of the metal ring removed so it will act as a hook is an excellent means to trigger trip wire firing device BBT's.

b. Evaluation: Presently the grappling hook and rope is the recognized method to trigger these devices. In order for each squad to have the capability of breaching such obstacles, three to four grappling hooks, with an ample amount of rope to allow the device to be triggered at a safe distance, are required to be effective. By using the nose plug of these artillery rounds with a light weight rope or strong twine, we greatly reduce the weight factor. In addition the small unit leader has the capability to destroy these casualty producing devices by a readily available means.

c. Recommendation: This method be made known to small unit leaders, particularly those working in areas saturated with BBT's, in order that they may have the capability of removing these casualty producing obstacles with a simple but very effective make shift device.

### 6. (C) Being Lured Into Booby Trapped Areas.

a. Observation: Small groups (3-7) of VC/NVA will fire at US units trying to induce them to chase the enemy through booby trapped areas.

b. Evaluation: US units that have chased these small groups of VC/NVA have suffered casualties they would not have suffered if they were not involved in a fast and careless chase.

c. Recommendation: Units in pursuit of the enemy should not sacrifice caution for speed; small airmobile elements should be deployed to block routes of escape of fleeing VC/NVA small units when no ground elements are in a position to set up blocking positions; and, all previously detected booby-trap areas should be plotted on all maps and avoided in the pursuit of the enemy.

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### 7. (C) Graphs of Booby Trapped Areas.

a. Observation: Graphs made of the locations of booby traps that were set off or discovered indicate there are safe lanes in some of the areas.

b. Evaluation: It is believed these safe lanes are routes of movement of VC/VA elements. It is also believed the enemy may use these lanes for movement of sojourning forces and later booby trapping them when the routes are discovered by US/Allied troops.

c. Recommendation: Efforts should be made to locate such safe lanes and ambushes should be established within the lanes.

### 8. (C) Flame Operations.

a. Observation: The demand for flame drops, since the acquisition for the Navy cargo net (see para 1c (1)), has at times exceeded the capability of the M4 Flame Service Unit to provide thickened fuel.

b. Evaluation: The tank capacity of the M4 Unit is 200 gallons. It can produce 75 drums of 4% thickened fuel in an 8 hour period. The quantity drops to 50 when 8% fuel is mixed for fougasse. Flame drops require 1% thickened fuel for ignition and 4% for a longer burning time; a mixture of 10 drums of each has been used. When ample stocks were not available, drums of old fougasse (8% thickened fuel) and drums of JP-4/diesel oil mix were added to the 10 drums of 4% fuel to make up the 20 drum load. Flame drops conducted using this mixture still proved highly effective as long as a sufficient amount of the 4% thickened fuel was present.

c. Recommendation: That when a flame drop is requested, and a full load (20 drums) of 1% or 4% thickened fuel is not available, drums of 8% thickened fuel, and JP-4/diesel oil mix can be added to complete the load as long as at least 10 drums of the 4% are available. This provided a use for old fougasse which is normally destroyed.

### 9. (C) Downwind Drift of Riot Control Agent (RCA) CS-1.

a. Observation: The delivery of persistent RCA, CS-1 in 55 gallon drums can cause considerable downwind drift even with ground bursts.

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b. Evaluation: It has been found that CS-1 will travel a significant distance downwind under conditions such as high air turbulence, a large or neutral temperature gradient or high wind speeds. In one case the effects of the agent were noted at a distance of 1.5 km from the target.

c. Recommendation: That if CS-1 is to be employed in the vicinity of a planned operation, all personnel involved in the operation must have protective masks and must be informed of the target location and time of employment; that if these conditions are not met, CS-1 should not be used in support of the operation; and to preclude unnecessary drift, CS blocking positions should not be established beneath flight paths of helicopters.

C. TR INTC: None.

D. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (C) Airborne Personnel Detector Exploitation.

a. Observation: APD missions provide valuable data to the intelligence collection effort and have proved highly reliable.

b. Evaluation: It has been found that when APD readings were exploited (by artillery, RF or tactical air), secondary explosions and fires have occurred. In many instances, when ground units or air cavalry have exploited previously reported "sniffer" areas, contact with enemy forces has resulted. In this connection, the CIC of the sniffer team has been instructed to call significant readings directly to the brigade responsible for that AO, to permit rapid exploitation. The division artillery FOC is also called when the location is not within a brigade boundary.

c. Recommendation: That to receive the maximum effect of significant sniffer readings, the responsible brigade should continue to make every effort to place artillery fire or ARA on the reported area as soon as practical; that, if a FAC is available in the area, the sniffer CIC should contact him directly in order to pinpoint the area for exploitation by tactical air strikes.

2. (C) Comprehensive description of enemy structures and materiel.

a. During operations higher headquarters require a detailed description of enemy structures, caches, trail markers, booby traps and materiel.

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b. Evaluation: In many cases, the item could not be evaluated (bunkers, buildings, BPT's) and in some cases a description of the surrounding environment was required. Due to personal differences in observation and reporting techniques, the quality and accuracy of the intelligence report varied. Also, on occasions, added requirements were levied subsequent to departure from the area.

c. Recommendation: Photos, with identifying data, could be available at division level within hours after discovery, Polaroid Swinger cameras (cost under \$20.00) and film should be made available on the basis of six per infantry battalion.

E. LOGISTICS

1. (U) Kickout Resupply.

a. Observation: Resupplying of water to an element in the jungle is difficult to accomplish by water cans or plastic drums.

b. Evaluation: Medium and heavy artillery (155mm, 175mm, 8 in) batteries use metal canisters to store the fuzes used by the guns. The canisters are water tight and can be used as a water resupply kick-out to the forward units.

c. Recommendation: That infantry units operating in jungle terrain coordinate with artillery batteries to obtain these canisters on a large scale basis.

2. (U) Red Ball Special Handling Requisitions.

a. Observation: Red Ball Special Handling requisitions should include radar and FADAC equipment due to the essential nature of their mission.

b. Evaluation: Repair parts required to move FADAC and Radar equipment from deadline could be obtained more expeditiously in that special attention would be given these requisitions. Requisitions submitted for required reports using normal RBE procedures require considerably more time and processing than Red Ball Special handling. Down time for FADAC and radar equipment will be reduced significantly if Red Ball Special Handling Procedures are utilized.

c. Recommendation: That repair parts for FADAC and radar equipment be authorized for requisition utilizing Red Ball Special Handling Procedures.

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3. (C) Fuel and Ammo Point.

a. Observation: A rapid refuel/rearm point is needed to support an Air Cavalry Troop when the refuel distance is more than 20 minutes from the AC.

b. Evaluation: This facility should carry just enough for one day's operations. By palletizing "ready to go ammo" and hooking in six bladders of fuel this point can be operational in 30 minutes. The Aero Rifle Platoon can be displaced forward with a security force for the ICL point and provide additional protection and local patrolling. Both the ICL and the ammo remained rigged ready for evacuation if the enemy should attempt to close it. The Chinook and Slicks are on standby to pick up the point and move it to a new location. This location needs only enough room to refuel two aircraft at a time thus abandoned fire bases are excellent choices above an open field of clearing.

c. Recommendation: The point should be scouted every time an aircraft lands for fuel, and, when possible it should stay in place no longer than 4 hours.

F. ORGANIZATION

1. (U) Airmobile Engineer Battalion TOE 5-215T.

a. Observation: The current airmobile engineer battalion TOE is inadequate to effectively support the airmobile division.

b. Evaluation: Experience obtained from airmobile operations has proven that the three brigades are normally committed in the area of operations and require extensive engineer support. Organic engineer support for protective facilities and base camp development projects that require immediate action is inadequate. Many of these immediate type requirements are normally the responsibility of non-divisional engineer units. However, the geographical dispersion of these units frequently precludes rapid execution of engineer support requirements. TOE 5-215T provides for three line companies and a headquarters company. This organization is satisfactory to provide combat support to the infantry brigades, but it does not afford flexibility to provide adequate support for the division support units and the immediate base development requirements. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company consists of 269 officers and enlisted men and all major items of engineer construction equipment organic to the division. This organization is too large and diversified to be supervised and controlled by a single company organization.

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c. Recommendation: A general support company consisting of two equipment platoons composed basically of the same equipment that is presently in the two heavy equipment platoons and one light equipment platoon; one combat engineer platoon with an equipment augmentation of three electric tool trailers and three cobra drills; a maintenance platoon; and a headquarters platoon would be desirable. A MTOF is presently being finalized for submission to USARV and will include these recommended changes.

**G. SIGNAL:**

1. (U) Employment of Radio Set control group AN/GRA-39/mortar section communication.

a. Observation: The Battalion mortar section is presently authorized the field telephone set TA-312 to provide communications between the FDC bunker and the mortar tubes; this system has made it necessary to have one man monitor the phone continuously at each firing point and orally relay the firing data to his respective gun crew.

b. Evaluation: This method of communications is not effective. One crew member must monitor the TA-312 which precludes him from performing other duties. If an error is made in receiving the data, it cannot be detected at the gun site. Errors should be caught during the read-back; however, this delays the laying of the guns. The radio set control group AN/GRA-39 has been used at the gun position instead of a field phone and the efficiency of the crews thus equipped has been greatly increased. The speaker portion of the control group (C-23281 CR -39) was placed at the gun site. This permits some mobility to the man responsible for relaying the data. Also the volume of this set makes it possible for the gun crews to monitor the initial data request. This gives them a headstart in laying in their guns, plus the capability of detecting possible mistakes generated by the man relaying the data.

c. Recommendation: That the TOF be modified to equip mortar units with one C-2328/GRA-39 component of the AN/GRA-39 control group per tube.

2. (U) The MTC-7 Manual Telephone.

a. Observation: The MTC-7 Manual Telephone Central Office is designed to handle 60 telephone circuits, but, with minor modifications the shelter can be utilized to handle 120 circuits.

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b. Evaluation: The LTC-7 contains as a component one SB-86 double-stacked switchboard capable of handling 60 circuits. By removing the service table to the left of the permanently installed SB-86, room was made to mount a second double-stacked SB-86. This increases the LTC-7 to a capacity of 120 circuits which can be handled by two operators. The second switch-board can be easily removed to remain at base camps when it is necessary to provide a switchboard at a brigade tactical command post.

c. Recommendation: That the modified LTC-7 be utilized since it is more compact and efficient than the LTC-10.

### 3. (U) Radio TTY Set AN/GRC-142.

a. Observation: When both long whip and doublet antennas are used with the GRC-142, more reliable communications can be obtained.

b. Evaluation: It has been observed that the effect of unfavorable atmospheric conditions on transmissions can be minimized if the operator is able to switch from the whip antenna to the doublet antenna, and vice versa.

c. Recommendation: That both the long whip and GP-50 doublet antennas be put up when installing a GRC-142 rig.

### 4. (C) FM Communications as an aid to engineer VHF communications.

a. Observation: FM communications have proven to be a valuable aid to VHF operators on isolated fire bases as a means of engineering their systems.

b. Evaluation: In most cases, the only means of communication that a VHF team will have with the other terminal will be FM radio. The ability to communicate between terminals has proven to be a tremendous aid in the quick installation of VHF radio relay systems. When problems occur after the shot is in operation, FM communications can be used to inform higher headquarters.

c. Recommendation: That all VHF teams be equipped with man-portable communications.

### 5. (C) TSEC/KY-8.

a. Observation: The KY-8 provides a reliable secure voice circuit.

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b. Evaluation: The KY-8 is designed to operate at 22-30 volts DC. However, it functions best at 26.5 volts DC. Lack of sufficient voltage will cause the KY-8 to malfunction.

c. Recommendation: That an adequate power source be provided to insure the KY-8 receives a stable 26.5 volts, and that prior to turning the KY-8 in for maintenance, the input voltage should be checked.

### 6. (C) Receiver - Transmitter RT-524.

a. Observation: The RT-524 provides a reliable secure voice circuit when used in conjunction with the KY-8.

b. Evaluation: When operating the RT-524 in "Wild Band Operation" (X MODE), the "Wild Band Operation" markings on the filter FL-40C2 should be upright as read facing the front of the equipment. The X MODE-NORMAL switch must be in the X MODE position.

c. Recommendation: That using organizations follow the steps outlined in para 7a (2), TM 11-5820-401-20 to insure the RT-524 is compatible with the KY-8.

### 17. (U) Radioteletype Terminal AN/VSC-2.

a. Observation: Lack of tape perforator equipment on AN/VSC-2 radio-teletype terminal does not allow for maximum speed and responsiveness.

b. Evaluation: The AN/VSC-2 Radioteletype terminal found at brigade and battalion level is not equipped with a TT-76 tape perforator. Configuration of this equipment includes AN/GRC-106 AFSSP Radio, one ID-522 Modem, one KW-7 Crypto Device and one TT-4 teletypewriter. In this configuration, the RATT operator must send each message letter-by-letter. Typing may be corrected only by retying the word or line resulting in slow operation and less than "clean" copy. In addition, a message being transmitted may not be "broken" by another subscriber for the purpose of sending a higher precedence message. Installation of TT-76 equipment would allow for transmission of "clean" copy at a steady rate of 60 words per minute, pre-runched messages, and would give each subscriber a "break" capability. Further, the VSC-2, which is installed in the rear of a 1 ton truck, does not allow for working space for the preparation of message logs, storage of running spares, and comfortable working conditions. From the standpoint of flexibility and responsiveness, the radio-teletype terminal AN/GRC-142, mounted on a 3/4 ton truck is more desirable for brigade and battalion size operations.



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C. Recommendation: Immediate action should be initiated to equip each AN/VSC-2 RATT terminal with a TT-76 perforator; to submit a small development requirement to USACDC and USAMC to add a TT-76 to the VSC-2 configuration; and, to investigate the feasibility of converting from the AN/VSC-2 to the AN/GRC-142.

### H. MAINTENANCE:

#### 1. (U) P-153 Mine Detectors.

a. Observation: A high deadline rate was experienced with the P-153 mine detector; problem areas included broken handles, scuffed heads, and damaged wiring.

b. Evaluation: An increased training program was initiated to improve operator's knowledge with respect to care and use of the mine detector. Measures were taken to insure that the mine detector was stored in the case at all times unless actually in use. Foam rubber or a suitable cushion material was fastened to the head of the detector to prevent damage to the head. These techniques in conjunction with a general training program lowered the deadline rate from 50% to approximately 25%.

c. Recommendation: That the head of the P-153 mine detector be covered with a protective cushion material.

#### 2. (U) Chainsaw Trouble Shooting.

a. Observation: During construction of fire bases a high mortality rate was experienced with chainsaws, especially with the starter rewinds and spurs.

b. Evaluation: Starter rewinds were being broken because of improper starting procedures. The operator pulled the starting cable out to its maximum length when only a short, brisk pull is required. The bolts securing the spur loosen after continuous operation and eventually the spur is damaged. Corrective action was taken. There was a noticeable decrease in the down-time of chainsaws.

c. Recommendation: That operators follow established procedures when starting chainsaws, and the bolts securing the spur be checked every four hours.

#### 3. (U) Recurring failures of aircraft assemblies.

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a. Observation: Several problem areas exist due to the recurrence of failures in aircraft assemblies.

b. Evaluation:

(1) OH-6A continuing problem areas:

(a) High frequency vibration (out of balance tail rotor assy).

(b) High engine oil pressure (defective sending units).

(c) Lateral Beats (low torque main rotor dampers).

(d) Altitude indicators continue to fail with none available through supply.

(e) Heading indicators, CN998 Gyro & wave sine filters continue to fail with no replacement in sight.

(2) UH-1C:

(a) In January we had a rash of leaking short shaft seals.

(b) Mixing lever bearing continues to wear out long before time change.

(c) Transmission input leaking.

(3) AH-1G:

(a) Both long and short tail boom cables require replacement at approximately 50 flying hours.

(b) Tail rotor chains and sprockets wear out far too early.

(c) Dog house fairing upper bracket breaks too easily.

(d) SAS, transducer and roll channel cards continue to fail at a high rate.

(e) Ammo door rivets pull loose.

(f) Hydraulic leaks and seeps continue to be a problem.

(g) Tail lights not available, none presently installed.

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AVDC-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CCFOR-65 (R1)

(4) Armament:

(a) XM-28 flex cables, gun control units, and intervolometers continue to be a problem with no or few spare parts available through supply channels.

(b) 40mm pawl assemblies cracking and/or shearing pins.

C. Recommendation: Corrective action be taken at appropriate higher maintenance echelons to reduce these deficiencies.

I. PSYOPS

(C) The "Voluntary Informant Program"

a. Observation: The Voluntary Informant Program (VIP) offers immediate cash rewards for voluntary informants providing enemy information or material.

b. Evaluation: This program has been widely publicized throughout the division area but the response has been somewhat disappointing. One of the factors limiting the response to this program is the natural reluctance of the people to provide information because of fear of reprisals. One technique that has been used to afford a person the opportunity to speak candidly without compromising himself is to question all people during medical treatment at MEDCAPS. This technique allows persons who desire to pass information to do so without fear that they will be suspected of voluntarily contacting allied military personnel to deliver information.

c. Recommendation: That MEDCAPS be evaluated as a means of eliciting a greater response to the VIP.

AVDC-GC

Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (RI)

III. Section 3, Department of the Army Survey Information: None.

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AVII-GCT (24 Feb 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

MAJ Sanderson/lrb/2506

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps AFO 96308 12 APR 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, AFO 96375

1. (U) The 101st Airborne Division (AK) Operational Report - Lessons Learned has been reviewed at this headquarters and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-15.

2. (C) Except as noted below, HQ, XXIV Corps concurs without further comment on commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations listed in Section 2 of the report. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning description of enemy structures and materiel, para D2, page 36. Concur in principle. The Polaroid Camera, Model 100, FSN 6270-933-7425, Line No Z12753 has been issued to one infantry battalion in Vietnam. Although more expensive (\$100.25) than the Polaroid Swinger, this camera provides better pictures. Unit should request desired cameras in their next MTOE submission.

b. Reference item concerning kickoff resupply para E1, page 37. Nonconcur. Metal canisters used to store artillery fuzes are a reuseable item and are in short supply. The five gallon, plastic, collapsible, Lug-A-Jug, FSN 7240-782-3236 which costs \$1.00, is recommended as a water container, and its cost and weight are only a fraction of the metal fuze container. The plastic container is available through normal supply channels. The Lug-A-Jug is equipped with a screw cap which prevents contamination and facilitates pouring into a canteen.

c. Reference item concerning employment of Radio Set Control Group AN/GRA-39/mortar section communication, para G1, page 39. Concur. Authorization for a C-2323/GRA-39 component of the AN/GRA-39 control group per mortar section should be requested by MTOE submission.

d. Reference item concerning FM communications as an aid to engineer VHF communications, para G4, page 40. Concur. Use of FM radios as an engineering system when employing multi-channel radios is standard practice in tactical signal units.

e. Reference item concerning TSEC/KY-3, para G5, page 40. Nonconcur. The HYP-2 power supply is an ancillary item for the KY-3 and provides adequate power to the KY-3. The HYP-2 is available through normal COMSEC logistics channels.

f. Reference item concerning Radioteletype Terminal AN/VSC-2, para G7, page 41. Concur in principle. Installation of a TT-76 tape perforator in  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton truck mounted AN/VSC-2 is impractical due to space requirements. One hundred percent replacement of existing AN/VSC-2 radio sets with AN/GRC-142 radio sets is deemed more appropriate.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVII-GCT (24 Feb 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

g. Reference item concerning failure of aircraft assemblies, para H3, page  
42. Concur. The unit should submit EIR's on unsatisfactory aircraft assemblies  
IAW TM 38-750.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*H. R. Taylor*  
H. R. TAYLOR  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adj

Cy Furn:  
DA ACSFOR  
CG, 101st Abn Div (AM)

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVHGC-DST (24 Feb 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division  
for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 MAY 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division.

2. Comments follow:


a. Reference item concerning BBT Removal, section II, page 34, paragraph B5; concur. The observation is a valid one and the item is considered a good field expedient. Dissemination of the suggestion will be made to all commands in the April edition of the USARV Mine-warfare Notes.

b. Reference item concerning Red Ball Special Handling Requisitions, section II, page 37, paragraph B(2); nonconcur. Red Ball Special Handling procedures are intended to give the highest requisitioning priorities to combat vehicles, such as tanks and self-propelled artillery. Field Artillery Data Computer (FADAC) and radar equipment do not fall into this category. Extension of Red Ball Special Handling to include more equipment will result in diminished priorities for combat equipment. Limiting the scope of Red Ball Special Handling allows more intensive response. Red Ball Express requisitioning procedures provide responsive repair parts support and have proven to be more adequate in support of noncombat equipment. The unit will be informed of the above. No action is required by higher headquarters.

c. Reference item concerning Radioteletype Terminal AN/VSC-2, section II, page 41, paragraph G10, and paragraph 2f of 1st Indorsement. Concur with 1st Indorsement comment as concerns impracticability of adding TT-76 to AN/VSC-2 configuration. As concerns replacement of the AN/VSC-2 with the AN/GRC-142, this is a doctrinal proposal which should properly be addressed by the United States Army Combat Developments Command (USACDC).

d. Reference item concerning recurring failures of aircraft assemblies, section II, page 42, paragraph H3; concur with comments by XXIV Corps in 1st Indorsement. Unit has been contacted to obtain information on the required Equipment Improvement Reports (EIR).

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
101st ABN Div  
XXIV Corps

GPOP-DT (24 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Abn Div for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 JUN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



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Inclosure 1 (TASK ORGANIZATION) to ORLL, 101st Airborne Division for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 1-101  
1-327 Inf  
2-327 Inf  
2-502 Inf  
2-320 Arty (DS)  
A-326 Engr (DS)  
A-326 Med  
B-801 Maint  
1-A-426 S&S  
1-265 RRC  
1-101 MP Co  
42 Inf Plat (Sct Dog)  
557 Inf Plat (Combat Tracker)  
Team, 101 MI Det  
FASCP, B-501 Sig (Redesignated  
FST, A-501 Sig eff 1 Dec 68)  
TACP, 19 Tac Air Spt Sqdn  
(1-30 Nov)  
TACP, 20 Tac Air Spt Sqdn  
(1 Dec - 31 Jan 69)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 2-101  
1-501 Inf  
2-501 Inf  
1-502 Inf  
1-321 Arty (DS)  
C-326 Engr (DS)  
B-326 Med  
C-801 Maint  
2-A-426 S&S  
2-265 RRC  
2-101 MP Co  
47 Inf Plat (Sct Dog)  
Team, 101 MI Det  
FASCP, B-501 Sig (Redesignated  
FST, A-501 Sig, eff 1 Dec 68)  
TACP, 19 Tac Air Spt Sqdn  
(1-30 Nov)  
TACP, 20 Tac Air Spt Sqdn  
(1 Dec - 31 Jan 69)

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 3-101  
3-187 Inf  
1-506 Inf  
2-506 Inf  
2-319 Arty (DS)  
E-326 Engr  
C-326 Med  
D-801 Maint  
3-A-426 S&S  
3-265 RRC  
3-101 MP Co  
58 Inf Plat (Sct Dog)  
Team, 101 MI Det  
FASCP, B-501 Sig (Redesignated  
FST, A-501 Sig, eff 1 Dec 68)  
TACP, 19 Tac Air Spt Sqdn  
(1-30 Nov)  
TACP, 20 Tac Air Spt Sqdn  
(1 Dec - 31 Jan 69)

101st Abn Div Arty

HHC  
2-11 Arty (DS)  
4-377 Arty (Avn)  
4-77 (ABA) (-)  
1-83 Arty (CS-R)  
2-138 Arty (CS-R)  
A-2-94 Arty (CS-R) (eff 28 Dec)  
3-1-40 Arty (CS-R) (eff 7 Nov)  
Plat, D-1-44 Arty (AWSP)  
Sec, C-29 Arty (Searchlight)  
Sec, C-65 Arty (Quad 50)  
550 Trans Det

160th Avn Gp

101 AHB  
158 AHB (-) (eff 29 Jan 69)  
163 Avn Co (CS)  
159 ASHB

Incl 1

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Inclosure 1 (TASK ORGANIZATION) to ORLL, 101st Airborne Division for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)

Division Troops

Div Spt Cmd

HHC, 101st Abn Div  
2-17 Cav  
P-58 Inf (LRP)  
D-1-1 Cav (attached)  
3-5 Cav (-) (OPCON eff 2 Nov)  
5-7 Cav (OPCON eff 2-9 Nov)  
C-2-34 Armor (OPCON)  
326 Engr (-)  
326 Med (-)  
501 Sig (-)  
101 Admin Co (-)  
101 MP Co (-)  
101 MI Det (-)  
265 RRC (-)  
10 Cml Plat  
20 Cml Det  
38 Cml Det (1 Nov - 20 Dec)  
22 Mil Hist Det  
25 PI Det  
34 PI Det  
359 Avn Spt Det (1-11 Nov)  
Det 16, Sub Unit, 1st ANGLICO  
Det 32 (-), 5th Weather Sqdn  
59th Sig Det (6-31 Jan)  
Det 4,7th PSYOPS Bn

HHC & Band  
326 Med (-)  
426 S&S (-)  
801 Maint (-)  
67 Maint Co  
5th Trans

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
<i>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)</i>		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		20. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310		Confidential
		21. GROUP
		4
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 101st Airborne Division		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CG, 101st Airborne Division		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
24 February 1969	56	
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	691328	
d. PROJECT NO.		
c. N/A	10. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		